AN ALTERNATIVE METHODOLOGY IN ISLAMIC

TOWARDS A UNIFIED APPROACH TO SHARI’AH AND SOCIAL INFERENCE

Forging and new methodology capable of analyzing complicated social phenomena on the one hand, and facilitating the derivation of rules and concept  from Devine Revelation on the other, is one of the paramount concerns of contemporary Islamic, scholarship , and the sole concern of this chapter. in dealing with this concern the chapter pursues two themes. First, an attempt is made to underscore the need reestablishing revelation as a primary as source of social theorizing. Second, a model of a unified methodological approach for analyzing both revealed texts and social phenomena is outlined.

The first difficulty confronting any attempt to develop an alternative methodological approach rooted in Islamic ontology lies in the exclusion of divine revelation from the realm of science. It is true that is exclusion of the internal conflict between the western religious and scientific communities. it also true the revelation and science were never perceived to be mutually exclusive in the Islamic scientific tradition. Yet a Muslim scholar can hardly ignore the fact that the divine revelation is out of place in modern scientific activities. It is for this reason that we choose ti begin our discussion by exposing the grounds for recognizing revelation as a major source of scientific knowledge.

The onslaught on revelation, leading to its exclusion from scientific endeavor, occurred through two phases. First, revelation was equated with ungrounded as a rival body of knowledge, contradistinguished to the body of knowledge deemed to be true by reason. Then it was asserted. a la Kant, that scientific activities should be confined to empirical reality, since human reason cannot ascertain transcendental reality. In what follows, I argue that scientific activities do presuppose metaphysical knowledge, and indeed impossible without transcendental presuppositions. Further, I contend that the truth of revelation is rooted in empirical reality, and that the equality of evidence supporting revealed truth is of no less caliber than that justifying empirical truth.

THE METAPHYSICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE

To begin with, the efforts to separate religious (i.e., metaphysical)  truth from scientific is wrong-headed and untenable. For not only is the knowledge of the physical rooted in the metaphysical but also the latter is not altogether divorced from the former. To appreciate the interconnectedness of the two, one has to remember that science and scientific activities are the result of a specific ontology which related the scientific endeavor of individual to his environment, and furnishes their motivational basis. Put differently, scientific activities presuppose a number of assertions about the nature of existence, the truth of which has to be acknowledged prior to any engagement in empirical studies. Among these metaphysical assertions, the following three stand out:

First, the natural world is governed by laws which endow the behavior of natural objects with order and regularity hence discoverable by human rationality

Three, knowledge is an important human value, superior to ignorance,

            These three transcendental principles are presupposed by all scientific activities, and rooted at the foundation of scientific tradition. Yet they are the type of assertions which cannot be examined by the methods currently accepted by modern western scientific tradition. Still, science as a vocation owes its existence to such transcendental principles.

            In a recent work published in 1990, James Rosenau, a leading scholar of international relation, contended that the seemingly disordered nature of international relation result from failure to discover the underlying order lying beneath the apparent disorder of world politics. Explaining the ground for insisting on the orderly nature of international disorder, he wrote:

While it may at first seem absurd to search for order beneath the disorder of world affairs, this contradictions is resolved when it is recognized that two different concept of order are involved. In one case, the concept denotes the presumption of causation, the idea that there is a cause for every effect, that nothing happens at random. The causes may not be presently knowable because the technology, resources, or time necessary to observe them is not available, but the premise of an underlying order springs from theoretical and not empirical possibilities. That is, when causative rather than random factors are presumed to be operative, nothing is theoretically beyond comprehension. in this sense, the world is, by an initial unprovable (but also irrefutable) assumption, an orderly place even though it may also be baffling and mysterious because the tools of observation are inadequate to the task of explanation.

            What Rosenau fails to state is that it is not simply a belief in causality that justifies the postulation of an order beneath the observed disorder, for causality could only establish linkage between an antecedent and a consequent. Rather, the postulated order is rooted in a suppressed  belief in a transcendental order, and in the rationality of the world.

In addition to constituting the basis of metaphysical assumption of science, a belief in a transcendental order is the foundation of scientific impetus. It is true that scientific activities can be motivated by utilitarian considerations. However, such a motivational basis was hardly possible in the early stage of the scientific tradition, when the rewards for scientific endeavor were not immediately forthcoming.

            It is worth noting that the emergence of a utilitarian grounding of ethical behavior in the western tradition coincided with the increased emphasis on positivistic approaches and the decline of interest in the transcendental. Through all these formidable changes, however, the transcendental principles which gave rise to science continued to form the metaphysical foundation for all scientific activities, a foundation which was widely presumed but rarely acknowledged.

            But the dependence on empirical and transcendental knowledge it is not-sided, where by the empirical is always dependent on the transcendental. Rather, the state of dependency is a reciprocal one in which the truth of the transcendental principles is empirically substantiated trough their manifestations. That is to say, although the transcendental principles of a postulated universal order are rooted in religious beliefs. The truth of these  principles is manifested in the empirically observable behavior of objects. 

THE RATIONALITY OF REVELATION

We saw earlier the undermining of revelation as a source of knowledge in the western tradition began by contrasting scientific with revealed knowledge. That is, knowledge was excluded from the realm of science by equating it with mystical faith while science was grounded on “rationality” it was therefore only a matter of time before knowledge founded on revelation was regaleted to the realm of irrationality. The question which has to be posed here may be stated as follows: is the distinction between reason and revelation possible.

            To answer this question we need, first, to examine the internal structure of both reason and divine revelation. The term revelation refers to a body written statetments in the form of a discourse which makes far-reaching claims about the origin, nature, and destiny of man the universe, and prescribes a set of rules for guiding individual and collective action. Under the heading of divine revelation one can find several discourses, which, though sharing certain common features, have some important differences. The term reason  on the other hand, has two distinct differences. Reason is sometimes used to denote a number of self-evident which govern the process of thinking of mentally competent people, regardless of their cultural and educational background. The most basic principles of reason which has been widely acknowledged is the principle of noncrontradiction. According to this principle the simultaneous assertion and denial of the same preposition is impossible. Reason, According to the foregoing conception, is an instrument or canon used for examining the coherence of a body of statements. This examination allows us to conclude that the examined statements are either coherent, and hence in conformity with the principles of reason, or contradictory, and thus in violation of reason. As such, revelation can be deemed irrational only when it contains contradictory statements.

            Yet the term reason is frequently used to denote the capacity of rational beings to acknowledge the truth of certain assertions and deny the truth of others. At the first glance, reason appears, according to this second conceptio, as human faculty, an organon possessed by all human beings. On closer examination, one can see that what is called raeson in the second usage of the term is a body of  knowledge which has been examined and systematized by the principles of logic. Further, our examinationof the second conception, i.e., the systematic body of knowledge, reveals that what is called reason, and reasonable consists of (1) transcedental assertions whose truth is based on sensory experience. In other words, reason in the second conception possesses a structure which resembles very closely the structure of revelation. Clearly, only by being a body of knowledge can reason pose itself as a rival to revelation.

The above conceptualization of reason leads to three important conclusions.

First, whether it is perceived as a mental instrument (canon) or a mental faculty (organon), reason manifest itself through a number of universal principles (e.g., identity, noncontradiction, excluded middle, causality) and procedures (abstraction, analysis, synthesis) employed by the human being for ascertaining the truth of assertions. As such,  reason has to be associated with the methods  and mechanisms used in science, and hence cannot be seen as a source of knowledge.

Secondly, the denial of the scientific validity of revelation can be attributed to the nature of the revealed assertios, nor to the structure of revelation itself. For both reason and revelation consist of transcedental and empirical assertions. It is safe to say, therefore, that the complete exclusion of revelation from the realm of science, is not the result of any inherent contradictions between the universal elements of revelation and reason. Further, it has to be attributed partly to the internal contradictions between reason and western religion, and partly to the internal conflict between the western scientific movement and the christian church.

Thirdly, although scientific tradition and the west has postulated all along the irrelevance of revelation and religion to scientific endeavor, it has nonetheless, approached  a number of metaphysical assertions in the worldview furnished by divine revelation, albeit without acknowledging its indebtedness to the divine.

REVEALED AND EMPIRICAL REALITY:

THE QUALITY OF EVIDENCE

In light of the foregoing discussion we may define science in terms of those activities aimed at ascertaining the truth of the various assertions made about the nature of reality. The modern, western exclusion of revelation from the realm of science is not based on the denial of the fact that divine revelation makes assertions about the nature of reality, for it obviously does. The exclusion is rather based on the claim that only empirical reality can be ascertained. Since non empirical (metaphysical) reality is not susceptible to verification through experiments, it cannot be included in the realm of science.

            The above argument is both simplistic and misleading, because it ignores and obscures the natures of both revealed and empirical evidence. The argument overlooks two essential facts.

First, our knowledge of empirical reality is not based on knowledge received immediately and empirically from the environment, but on theories which describe the underlying structures of reality. The structures are never  immediately encountered by the senses. Instead, these structures of empirical existence are inferred through the use of categories abstracted from the sensible, and mediated by purely ‘rational’ categories and statements. Using lockean terminology we could say that the theories we use to describe empirical reality consist of complex propositions. Therefore, our understanding of the relationship between the earth and the sun is mediated by mental constructs, and hence is completely at variance with the immediate impression received from the senses.

Second, the foregoing argument fails to see that revelation (at list in its final and islamic form) seeks its justification in empirical reality. From the point of view of divine revelation, empirical reality is the manifestation of a transcendental. Indeed the Qur’an abounds in verses (or signs) with emphasize the interconnectedness of the empirical and the transcendental.

            Most importantly, revelation underscores the important fact that the empirical is meaningless when it severed from the whole, which as Western science is willing to admit, transcends the boundaries of empirical reality.

            As such, revelation has to be approached not as an immediately accessible set of statement, but as given ‘phenomena’ consisting of signs whose understanding requires constant and recurring interpretation and systematization indeed, the Qur’an makes it abundantly clear that it consists if signs (ayat) whose understanding is contingent on the process thinking, contemplating, and reasoning:

            Verily, in these things are signs for those who consider (13:3)

            We detail our signs for people who know (6:97)

            The foregoing observation underscores the fact that  understand the truth of revelation one has to approach it in the same manner one approaches social phenomena or even natural phenomena. For one reason, the truth of all these phenomena is contingent on the ability of the theories which scholars and acientisis construct on the basic of the date generated by these phenomena to produce consistent and satisfactory explanations of experienced reality.

            Regarding revelation as a phenomenon, and hence as a source of knowledge, can be justified by citing another reason. The quality of evidence used to ascertain (i.e, to demonstrate objectively) the reality described by empirical theories is of no higher caliber than that employed to ascertain the reality described by revelation. In both cases the existence of the considered phenomenon is ascertained by being concomitantly borne in the consciousness of numsrous individuals who have had chance to experience firsthand the basic elements of the phenomenon. That is to say, as the social or physical phenomena can be ascertained by persons who have experienced the various elements comprising them, so can divine revelation be ascertained by persons who have experienced the truth of the various signs comprising it. In both cases the truth of the immediately acquired is intuitively ascertained, the only difference being that empirical reality experienced through the senses is apprehended through empirical intuition while transcendental reality experienced through revelation is apprehended through pure intuition.

            It is true that Western science, beginning with Kant, has confined intuition – the unity of the apprehended elements of a phenomenon – to empirical intuition, denying that transcendental elements can be apprehended. But Kant, as we saw earlier, was able to achieve this reduction by becoming confused about the process of pure intuition. For while Kant correctly conceived pure intuition as all representations...in which there is nothing that belongs to sensation, he insisted nonetheless that the use of pure intuition should be limited to empirical reality. But if pure intuition is obtained as a result of successive abstraction from the multiple representations required by empirical intuition, leading to a singular representation in which all concepts are united, Kant’s refusal to recognize the transcendental reality apprehended by pure intuition is both arbitrary and dogmatic.

REVELATOIN AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

            We have concluded in the previous section that revelation cannot be excluded from science, since it lies at this foundation. This is particularly true with regard to the area of scientific research known as social or human sciences. It is quite clear that here the influence of transcendental principles emanating from divine revelation is not confined to providing the basic conceptual and motivational foundation of the social sciences, but extends to the formation of the central theoretical elements of these sciences. Take, for instance, the important idea of human equality. The principle of equality lies at the center of modem political theory. Obviously, human equality is a transcendental principle which can be traced to divine revelation. Greek and Roman traditions people were never equal. They were divided into the sons of the gods on the one hand, and barbarians on the other. The same attitude exited among nomadic Arabs who claimed racial superiority over other races. It was the Islamic tradition, and to a lesser extend the Christian tradition, which emphasized equality of mankind. Yet the principle of equality is a transcendental, and does not lend it self to empirical verification. In fact, historical records of humanity show that for the most part human beings have been unequal.

            The fact that Western secularism continued to embrace principles and concepts generated within traditions rooted in divine revelation shows that the process of secularization in the West aimed at, in the first instance, at undermining ecclesiastical authority, and not at the complete repudiation of religious beliefs and values. Many religious ideas and values, such as freedom, equality, or the rationality of the universal order, became secular values and beliefs.

            But while modern Western sciences could emerge only by repudiating the Christian tradition and undermining Church authority, the classical Islamic sciences were inspired by revealed beliefs and values. Following are a few examples of Qur’anic statements which illustrate the importance Islamic assigns to truth seeking and scientific research:

And pursue not that of which you have no knowledge; for every act of hearing of seeing, or of (conceiving in) the mind will be inquired into.(17:36)

Many were the ways of life that have passed away before you: travel through the earth and see what the end of those who rejected the truth. (3:137)

Say: travel through the earth and see how Allah did originate creation. (29:20)

Say: are they equal, those who know and those who do not know ?

Allah will raise up many degrees in stature those of you who believe and who have been granted knowledge (58:11)

Therefore, the Islamic scientific tradition has never experienced any crisis similar to what occurred in the Western tradition. This clearly shows that the science revelation conflict is neither imperative nor universal, but specific to Western experience and Western religion. Any attempt to reproduce this conflict in Muslim culture is hence artificial, and inspired by an irrational desire to walk in the footsteps of another culture.

SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE

            Divine revelation has always been for classical Muslim scholarship a source of knowledge, but it was never considered the sole source. Early Muslim scholars recognized the general nature of the Revealed Discourse, the Qur’an. They realized that in order to derive rules and concepts from the Divine Text, they needed to acquire detailed knowledge about the structure of both language and reality – hence the terms qarinah lafziyah (verbal evidence) and qarinah lafziyah (existential evidence), which were frequently employed by Muslim scholar when using linguistic and practical knowledge to explain the text.

            But while early Muslim scholars developed elaborate schemes for analyzing the Divine Text, their analysis of social and historical structures was never based on an articulated and well-developed methodology. Consequently, their knowledge of society and history was based on common sense. It was not until the time of Ibn Khaldun that the Muslim scientific tradition witnessed a serious attempt to develop theories for explaining social interaction by identifying historical patterns. Although Ibn Khaldun was able to introduce highly matured theories of society and history, he never discussed the methodological foundation of his theorizing. Nor did the Muslim scholars who followed him make any attempt to elaborate the methodological approach he employed.

            The imbalanced growth of textual methods at the expense of practical and historical methods led to conceptual distortions, especially in those fields of inquiry where knowledge of the structures of society and social/political organizations was essential. Nowhere is this imbalance more apparent than in treatises intended to outline the structure of the Islamic political order. Al-Mawardi, for example, insisted that the designation (‘ahd) of the incoming head of the Islamic state by the outgoing head is legitimate. He predicated the legitimacy of the designation procedure on the precedent set by the designation of ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab by Abu Bakr, a designation, he argued, supported the consensus (ijma’) of the Muslim community.

            Yet neither did al-Mawardi, nor any of the classical scholars who accepted the legitimacy of the designation procedure, undertake a systematic and probing analysis of the actions of the Sahabah (the Prophet’s companions) so as to isolate the rules which guided them, and then to ascertain their compatibility with the political principles of Shari’ah. Because of the absence of mature methods which could facilitate a profound analysis of the purposes and rules determining the actions of early Muslims, or the social and political structures governing their interactions, classical scholars unwittingly elevated to the status of universality the actions of a historically determined community, and idealized the behavior of fallible human beings.

            While classical Muslim scholars considered the records of history a source of knowledge alongside revelation, they could not make full use of this source for two reasons. First, with the expection of Ibn Khaldun, classical Muslim scholars were primarily interested in identifying social and political models to be re-created and in specifying exemplary behaviors to be emulated. They were not interested in discovering patterns of behavior, or isolating general tandeneias which could be used to explain political interactions and social relations. Second, as a result of the first reason, classical Muslim scholars had never developed a methodology for analyzing social phenomena. The example set by Ibn Khuldun came two late in the evolution of Muslim scholarship and despite its impressive maturity, had no following in Muslim tradition. Its resounding impact took place in the western tradition. But in the West, the scientific and methodological imbalance took an opposite form. The distortion in the West was slanted toward the social and practical at the expense of the revealed.

            In light of the foregoing discussion, the task of developing a balanced scientific methodology should have a twofold aim. First, the new methodology should include procedures for deriving rules (law like statements) from both revelation and history. Second, the desired methodology must allow the integration of rules derived from the two sources. I will attempt in the remainder of this paper to sketch the general framework of a unified methodology for textual and contextual analysis.

THE REVEALED SOURCE

THE RULES TEXTUAL INFERENCE.

Divine revelation is given to us in the form of the Qur’anic discourse, The Qur’an is elaborated and expounded by prophetic statements and deeds, compiledin the form of Hadith. The Qur’an itself consist of statements revealed in a plecemeal fashion throughout a period  stretching over twenty three years. Qur’anic statements provided early Muslims with a universal world view and directed their actions through their struggle to establish a community, an ummah, based on the principles of islam.

The Qur’anic discourse  is truly unique in its style and approach, for it is not organized in a thematic fashion whereby an issue or an event is exposed at once in its entirety before the next issue is discussed. Rather, one finds facets and aspects of a question or an event revealed in different surahs and ayahs of the revealed book. This means that in order for the reader to understand the Qur’anic view or position regarding a specific question, he has to treat the Qur’anic discourse as a comprehensive whole; any attempt to determine the Qur’anic position regarding a human act by comptemplating isolated Qur’anic statements is bound to lead to inconsistencies, or outright misconception. Take, for example, the following Qur’anic statement from Surat al-Nisa’ : O ye who believe ! Approach not prayers with a mind intoxicated, until you can understand what you say. (4:43).

Based on the above statement, the Qur’anic position concerning the consumption of intoxicating substances denotes a prohibition of their use shortly before the performance of prayer. Yet the rule derived from the above ayah is only partially correct. The completely correct Qur’anic position concerning the consumption of intoxicating substance can be found in another ayah in Surat al-Maidah, which represents a more pronounced stage in the progressive war against intoxicants:

O you who believe intoxicants, gambling, (dedication of) stones, and (divination by) arrows, are an abomination of Satan’s handiwork: eschew such (abominations) that you may prosper. (5:90)

Therefore, to derive rules and concepts from Divine revelation, we need to employ a method sufficiently developed to allow the derivation and systematization of these rules and concepts. The method proposed here is comprised four procedural steps (see diagram 1):

Step one aims at identifying all statements, both Qur’anic and prophetic, relevant to the question at hand. For example, to determine the Qur’anic position regarding the relationship between the ruler and the ruled, one has to compile Qur’anic statements relating to the terms imam (leader), wali al-amr (ruler), ta’ah (obedience), and nasr (support). A comprehensive survey of the Qur’anic statements shows that the four terms cited above appear in the following ayahs:

1.      Imam: 15:79, 36:12, 2:124, 11:17, 25:74, 46:12, 17:71, 9:12, 21:73, 28:41, 32:24.

2.      Wali al-amr: 4:59, 24:51, 33:67, 25:52.

3.      Ta’ah: 43:54, 24:51, 33:67, 25:52.

4.      Nasr: 9:40, 7:157.

It should be stressed, however, that identifying the relevant ayahs is not a mechanical procedure, but involves a good deal of analysis and familiarity with semantic usages.

Step two involves an attempt to understand the meaning of relevant Qur’anic statements,

individually and in relation to one another. Interpretation of revealed statements requires, first, that the rules of the Arabic language in which the Qur’an was revealed to be observed. Any interpretation which violates these rules is bound to lead distortions. Many of the distorted interpretations of the Qur’an which we are aware of have resulted from the liberal use, especially by Shi’a and Sufi scolars, of metaphoric analysis of the text, even when the rules of metaphor do not permit such interpretations. For example, the Shi’a scholar ‘Ali ibn al-Husain ibn Babuyah al-Qummi interpreted the ayah: ‘Say: see if your stream be some morning lost (in the underground earth), who then can supply you with clear-flowing water?’ (67:30) in the following terms: ‘This ayah was revealed in relation to the established imam, saying if your imam disappears one morning who will bring a known imam?’

Clearly the metaphoric interpretation of Ibn Babuyah al-Qummi violates the first rule of metaphoric interpretation which stipulates that only when the literal meaning of the text is deficient, a metaphoric interpretation called for. However, the literal meaning of the above mentioned ayah is far from being deficient or incoherent. The literal meaning is quite clear, for it reminds people of Allah’s favors on them, and exhort them to heed the warning of Allah, lest He deprives them of the goods they take for granted.

The meaning of Qur’anic statements cannot be apprehended simply by analyzing the lexical usage of their individual terms. Rather, the meaning of each statement must be determined within three interrelated contexts: textual context (siyaq nassi), discursive  context (siyaq khitabi), and existential context (siyaq hali). That is to say, the Qur’anic verse must be understood first, in the context of the chapter of which it is a part, then in the context of the entire Qur’anic discourse, and finally in the context of the socio-historical events which accompanied its revelation.

The third context, the existential, is what is generally known in tafsir (Qur’anic exegesis) by the phrase asbab al-nuzul (reasons of revelation).

Indeed examining the existential context of a statement is very crucial for its correct interpretation. This is quite apparent in understanding the meaning of fasiq in the following ayah:

O you who believe! If a fasiq (unprincipled) person comes to you with any news, ascertain the truth, lest you harm people unwittingly, and afterwards become full or regret for what you have done.

The term fasiq is used in the Qur’an to denote a person who, despite his awareness of  the  principles of rightness, succumbs to his whims and vain desires. Therefore, an interpretation based solely on the lexical meaning of the term points to the need for ascertaining the truth of the received news only when the person who bought them is a know fasiq. Yet upon examining the events which accompanied its revelation, a new picture emerges. Ibn Kathir narrates (on the authority of Mujahid and Qatadah) that the Messenger of Allah sent.

Al –walid ibn ‘uqbah to Bani al-musta’liq to collect zakah (when they learnt of his arrival) they came out (to receive him at the outskirts en they learnt of his arrival) they came out (to receive him at the outskirts of their town) to give him the zakah. (upon seeking their masses marching to upon seeking their masses marching towards him) he turned back to Medina and told the prophet that Banu al-musta’liq are marching to attack you, and that they have abandoned their commitment to Islam. The prophet then sent Khalid ibn al-walid to investigate the matter, and ordered him to carefully inquire ( into the truth of matter) and to avoid hasty decisions. (Khalid) arrived near their town at night, and (immediately) dispatched scouts. They came back with the news that (Banu al-musta’liq) were still committed to Islam, and that they have heard their adhan and prayers. At morning Khalid visited them and was pleased with what he saw. He (later) went back to the prophet, and informed him about his findings. Thus Allah revealed the ayah.

The above narration gives us a markedly different understanding of the ayah, for it shows that ascertaining the truth of the received news is required not only when the person who brings it is a known fasiq, but even when his fasiq tendency is still not evident. For clearly had al-walid been known fasiq, he would have not been trusted with the important task collecting the zakah on behalf of the Prophet himself. Evidently, the collection of the zakah was trying mission for al-walid, because it revealed his lack of courage, as well as his willingness to exaggerate and to use his imagination to cover his fear, the cause of his failure to complete the mission.

Step three is concerned with the ta’lil (explanation) of the text, i.e., identifying the efficient cause (‘illah) for which the command or directive embodied in the text was made. Or, alternatively, the objective in this step is to identify the common property or attribute, possessed by different objects, which  justify the use of a ruling is a first step in the endeavor to discover the universal principles which regulate and govern the various pronouncements of Shari’ah. For example, scholars have contemplated the ‘illah of the following Shari’ah rulings (1) prohibition of selling juzaf (unmeasured) for makil (measured) commodities;(2) prohibition of selling ghaib (absent) commodities.

They discovered that the ‘illah of the prohibition in both cases was the protection of the buyer against deception (gharar). By understanding the general principles embodied in the two rulings, we are able not only to extend the application of the principles to other transaction which have not been ruled upon by Revelation, but we can even allow the selling of the unmeasured or the absent if the buyer can be protected from becoming a victim of gharar (deception). For instance, if the buyer can be guaranteed the quality of the product beforehand, or if he can be permitted to return the product if it does not meet his conditions after he receives it, then the selling of the absent can be permitted. Indeed, Muslim jurist have permitted what they refereed to as ‘aqd al-istisna’ (the contract of manufacturing) on this basis.

Because the process of ta’lil frees us from social and historical contingencies, it is more crucial for analyzing textual statements which relate to social and political action. The ayahs dealing with the rules of peace and war is a case in point. Here we find texts instructing Muslims to fight the enemies of Islam, while others encourage Muslims to establish peace when the enemy is inclined to stop fighting. Developing a clear understanding as to when the peacemaking is desirable and when war is advisable requires an elaborate process of ta’lil.

Step four aims at bringing unity and order into the various rules and principles derived from the Revealed Text. This means that various rules need to be built into a comprehensive and internally consistent system. This can be achieved though a process of successive abstraction whereby rules derived from the text are subsumed under another set of rules standing on a higher level of high abstraction. This process should be repeated until a set of universal principles which cannot be further reduced is obtained. It is at this level of high abstraction that ordering of the system of rules or law like statements can be attained. Identifying the interrelationship among the various concepts becomes possible at a high level of abstraction, since one is left with a manageable number of concepts to deal with, something which is definitely impossible at the level of immediate apprehension of reality. Indeed, only at the level of high abstraction do we begin to get a grasp on the underlying structure of reality.

The process of successive abstraction, which also signifies a successive induction whereby the particular is subsumed under the universal, is followed by a process of successive deduction in which the internal consistency of the universal and the particular is ascertained.

The model outlined above is based on the principe’s (qawai’d) approach, an approach matured in the work of the Muslim jurist al-‘Izz ibn ‘Abd al-Salam al-Sulami, and was later developed into a full-fledged methodology in the theory of maqasid by Ibrahim ibn Ishaq al-Shatibi.

THE HISTORICAL SOURCE RULES OF HISTORICAL INFERENCE

The system of rules and concept derived from the revealed source of knowledge is insufficient for grounding action, for two reasons. First, because the system consists of general and universal rules, its application to particular cases requires further deliberation and specification. This can be done by incorporating information about the nature of individual and collective action and interaction. Second, the application of universal rules requires knowledge about existing conditions. Only when the theoretical conditions of an action correspond with its actual conditions does the application of the rule become possible. For example, to determine whether a specific human being, Zayd, should pay zakah, one should first identify the theoretical conditions of zakah payment, such as possession of nisab and being Muslim. Then it must be determined before the application of the zakah rule whether Zayd does indeed possess the nisab, and whether he is Muslim. Similarly, to determine whether a peace treaty should be signed between an Islamic state and a neighboring non-Muslim state, it is not sufficient to know   the theoretical conditions: the actual conditions should be examined in order to determine whether they correspond with the theoretical.

It may be concluded, therefore, that a thorough study and analysis of human actions and interactions must be undertaken before a revealed rule can be implemented, and that an appropriate methodology for the study of action must be identified. Yet methodologies developed by Western scholarship cannot be used by Muslim scholars for studying human phenomena for at least two reasons. First, the metaphysical foundation of Western methodologies, which is never explicitly discussed but always implicitly presupposed, does not accord with the ontology of revelation. Second, many of western approaches are designed to deduce conclusions from models developed by contemplating Western experience. That is to say, while Western models or systems are inductively built by abstracting from Western experiences, it is assumed that these systems are universally valid. Considering the ontological and ethical differences between the Islamic and western scientific traditions, the need for models and systems which incorporate Muslim experiences and Islamic concerns is a obvious.

To do this, this uniformity of human purposes, motives and goals should be rejected, and social phenomena must be explained by analyzing their basic building blocks, .i.e., human actions. Put differently, discovering the rules governing the underlying structures of social phenomena, namely Human action. The analysis of action may be done through four steps (see diagram 2):

            Step one aims at analyzing the actions of the individuals involved in the social phenomenon under consideration . by analyzing the action we mean disclosing its three determinants: purpose, motive, and rule. The purpose is the overall object which the actor sets out realize. The motive of the action is, on the other hand, the psychological impetus of the actor; motivation to act stems either from a commitment to moral principle, or from self-interest. Finally, the rule is the technical procedure which the actor must follow in order to attain the purpose of the action.

            To illustrate the above procedure let us take the example of party elections. One of the primary Actors in a party elections is the candidate, the three components of action have to be identified. In this example, the purpose of the action is the end towards which the energy of the actor is the directed, namely winning the election. The motive of the action could be either a commitment to a moral principle expressed in he form of a policy which the candidate embraces, or material or psychological benefits to be attained by the candidate and his supporters, or the combination of  both. Finally, the technical rule, relating to the mean available to the actor, and whose employment is necessary for attaining the purpose is reflected in the skills and techniques which the candidate can employ in his struggle to achieve the goal. Thus, winning the election unites the political candidate and his supporters into a purposive among the member of the group is the result either their shared value commitments or their shared interest. That is, the group’s support to the candidate may result either from the latter’s declared intention to actualize value commitments shared by the group through public policy, or from the candidates declaration that he will, Say, reduce the tax rate, a measure which would benefit his supporters.

            Step two deals with the classification of the various modes or types of action on the basis of the similarities or difference of the components. Action which have similar purposes form a homogenous group, while actions with different purposes divide the population into heterogeneous groups. Differences in the technical rules divide each of the identified purposive groups into functional subgroups.

            It should be observed That this step is not completely separate from the first one. Occasionally the division of the population into groups and subgroups precedes the in-depth analysis of individual actions. Since it is impossible to analyze the action of each and very individual, we often select individuals whose actions are considered representative of their groups. Yet the early grouping is usually done intuitively, and hence has to be modified and refined on the basis of the analysis of the actions of the selected representative of the various groups.

            Step three involves the efforts to identify the universal rules which govern the interaction between the various groups identified in step two. To isolate the universal rules or laws of interaction, the patterns cooperation and conflict, domination and submission, growth and decline should be comparatively studied across time and geographical space. Clearly, research in this area could be quite complex and hence requires further elaboration.

            Finally, in step four, the universal rules arrived at in the previous step need to be systematized in a fashion not different from the one employed in textual deprivation. The systematization here must aim at eliminating internal inconsistencies within the system of rules acquired through historical derivation, as well as those derived from revelation.

A UNIFIED METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

            A glance at the rules of the rules of textual and historical inference reveals a general pattern of scientific inference shared by both approaches. The general pattern may be summarized in the following five procedures :

1. Analysis of the text/phenomenon into its basic components, statement /actions

2. Grouping of similar statements/actions under one category.

3. Identification of the rules which unify the various categories.

4. Identification of the general rules and purposes which govern interaction/interrelation of various categories

5. Systematization of the body of rules obtained through the previous procedures (i.e., eliminating contradiction).           

            The unity of the patterns of textual and actual (historical) interference is not confined to the similarity of the proposed procedures for textual and historical analysis, but is extended to the structures of both action and discourse. Both collective action and discourse consist of system of rules and purposes which bring unity and coherence to each, and allows comparison and contrast between the two.  By comparing the rules and purposes of the system action (social phenomenon) and the system of text (discourse), one can examine the extent to which the two are or are not compatible. The significance of this is twofold:

1. The system of rules derived from revelation can be used as an evaluative framework, without confusing the ideal with the actual.

2. When actual practices depart from confessed rules and purposed (divine or otherwise) the actual rules and purposes embodied in practices can be reconstructed and contrasted with the ideal.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND THEORY BUILDING

The set of universal statements derived from revealed and historical records constitutes a theoretical framework, which serves as the basis of any theorizing about social phenomena. The system of history-based and revelation-based rules is neither absolute nor closed. Rather, it is subject to a process of constant refinement and perfection. The perfection of the theoretical framework results from the efforts aimed at utilizing the body of universal rules available for the purpose of explaining social phenomena, or guiding collective action. These efforts lead to theory building whereby specific rules and concepts are employed for explaining specific phenomenon (see diagram 4).

The process of theory building provides us with opportunities to verify, clarify, and enlarge the theoretical framework. The process of theory building takes place through two phases:

1. A set of universal principles is incorporated into a theory designed to explain or predict, and hence guide, the action of a specific human interaction.

2. The soundness of the theory is examined by contrasting hypotheses derived from the theory with observed actions, or events. As long as the theory is able to provide us with clear explanations or accurate predictions, it should be considered sound. However, a repeated mismatch between the observed behavior and the deduced hypotheses indicates the incorrectness or inaccuracy of some the universal rules, and points to the inadequacy of the theory, and thus calls for modification in the developed theory and/ or the universal rules and concepts.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

An attempt has been made in this paper to provide a methodological approach which recognizes revelation as a primary source of knowledge, and aspires to employ both text and action analysis techniques as necessary tools for theory building. The technical procedures (i.e., methods) have not been identified in this chapter, but these can be appropriated from among the textual methods of classical muslim scholarship and modern western scholarship discussed in previous chapters, either immediately or after some refinement and modification.

The methodological approach delineated above provides us only with a model of social scientific inquiry. The model is meant to be a first approximation towards developing an alternative methodology friendly to Islamic ideals and aspirations. It requires as such further elaboration, modification and refinement, whereby interrelationship between rules derived from revelation and those abstracted from experience is specified. This relationship, however, has to be determined separately within each of the various social science disciplines.     

            Besides the important task of combining the scientific research into the divine revelation, the proposed methodology enjoys several advantages over current dominant Western methodological approaches, including the following.

First, while the approach allows us to generelalisasi about the characteristics and analysis of representative members of the group, it allows miodifikasi and further refinement of our conception of group behavior by looking into the actions that were previously unexamined members. Indeed, the fact that the procedure provided by the proposed methodology allows the grouping individuberdasarkan similarity and a difference component guard action against the assumptions of uniformity of unwarranted behavior.

Second, the proposed approach combines the action-theory perspective with systems theory perspective. As a result, while allowing us to deal with collective interaction as a system, he regarded this as an open system, capable of change. The approach, therefore, avoid purely theoretical nature of system-on approach.

Third, the proposed approach, while accommodating changes, trends away West relativist approach geared to recognize differences and poerubahan. In other words, the approach allows us to avoid both absolutism and relitivisme. Former avoided because of the recognition of and historical records reveal, the latter being aware that the framework itself is anchored dikebenaran divine from the source revealed.

Finally, while the approach does not hide the ethical and ontological commitments, it is not like western methodology, does not lend itself to ethnocentrism. The latter is a direct result of the universality of linking the western-based theories while embracing the values ​​and categories specific to the western experience.